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Introduction
In this paper, I will talk about the peace process 
and peace education for development by raising 
five points for discussion. More specifically, I will 
talk mainly about the formal peace negotiation 
between the government and the rebel groups, 
namely, the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF), from 1975 to the present, and on the issue 
of the Lumad or indigenous peoples of Mindanao. 
I draw on my many years of experience as an 
academic, peace advocate, and member of the 
government peace panel in talks with the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) from 1993 to 
1996 and with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) from 2004 to 2008. 
1. On the Frameworks of the Peace Talks
 When the Muslim Independent Movement 
(MIM) articulated its cause in 1968, its intention 
was to put up an Islamic state in predominantly 
Muslim areas of Mindanao.1 The MNLF’s 
proclaimed goal was to establish a Bangsamoro 
Republik covering the entirety of Mindanao, Sulu, 
and Palawan. The MILF announced its vision to 
create an Islamic state covering the predominantly 
Muslim areas of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. 
The government has always been threatened and 
has consistently defended itself, insisting that 
it cannot allow the constitution and national 
sovereignty to be undermined and the territory of 
1. Former President Ferdinand Marcos had a private talk with 
Datu Udtog Matalam, the head of the Muslim Independence 
Movement (which later became the Mindanao Independence 
Movement), and then Marcos appointed Matalam as 
presidential adviser on Muslim affairs and gifted him with a 
gold wristwatch. After which, there was no more activity in 
the MIM front. 
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the republic to be dismembered. The assumption 
is that the republic is standing on solid foundation 
and must be defended at all cost.
 While negotiations between the government 
and the Bangsamoro, mainly the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), has been going on in the 
last forty years, from 1975 to the present, already 
between 100,000 and 120,000 lives have been lost 
and billions of pesos have gone down the drain. 
If the problem has taken so long to discuss and 
has not yet been solved, maybe we do not have 
a common grasp of the problem. So how about 
rethinking the problem? Some military generals 
have said, “We were second lieutenants when we 
started fighting the Moro rebels in the early ’70s. 
Now, we are generals and are still fighting.” They 
have solid reason to think that military force is 
not the answer. The peaceful way, peace process, 
peace education, and community dialogues just 
might provide the way, they added.
 In the ensuing peace negotiations, informal 
and formal, with both the MNLF and the MILF, 
from Ferdinand Marcos (1972) to Benigno 
Simeon C. Aquino III, the stand of the Office of 
the President to the peace negotiating panel has 
always been to negotiate within the framework 
of the Philippine Constitution and the territorial 
integrity of the republic. This was how the Tripoli 
Agreement of December 1976 was reached, with 
the insertion of these two paragraphs: (1) “First: 
The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern 
Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of the 
Philippines,” and (2) “The Government of the 
Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional 
processes for the implementation of the entire 
Agreement.” The Final Peace Agreement on the 
implementation of the Tripoli Agreement was 
proof that the Philippine government has opened 
itself to political restructuring with the creation 
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM).   
 But the MILF did not accept the said Final 
Agreement and proceeded with the Moro struggle 
for self-determination. After years of GRP–MILF 
negotiation, the Memorandum of Agreement on 
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)2 was born in July 
2008. Political oppositions immediately raised 
the issue to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme 
Court aborted the signing and soon ruled the 
MOA-AD as unconstitutional in October of the 
same year. 
 In the negotiations during the term of 
President Aquino, the two panels arrived at what 
I call a historic convergence in succession, the 
Ten Decisions (April 2012) and the Framework 
Agreement (October 2012), a political leap from 
the ARMM. What items are politically new? Let 
me cite four of the ten decisions:
•	 The recognition of Bangsamoro identity and 
the legitimate grievances3 and claims of the 
Bangsamoro people.
•	 The ARMM is unacceptable and a new autonomous 
political entity shall take its place.
•	 The new autonomous political entity shall have a 
ministerial form of government.
•	 There will be power sharing and wealth sharing 
between the national government and the new 
political entity. 
 The Ten Decisions became the guide in the 
formulation of the Framework Agreement on 
the Bangsamoro. Part of the framework is the 
four annexes on power sharing, wealth sharing, 
normalization, and transition arrangements, the 
discussion on which are ongoing. Let me highlight 
the following additional details:
•	 The Bangsamoro shall be governed by a basic law, 
formulated and ratified by the Bangsamoro. 
•	 Core territory of the Bangsamoro: (1) ARMM 
2. I became a subject of “persona non grata” official 
resolution by no less than the city council where I reside – for 
my participation in the MOA-AD in 2008. I am not taking 
this personally; this is a demonstration of the emotional 
dimension of the problem.
3. Legitimate grievance is an open concept, undefined and 
not acceptable to all. It is also a feeling, an emotion, with 
corresponding energy. In short, we are dealing with live people. 
The best thing really is to do consultation with those who are 
directly affected by the conflict. When they see that people 
care enough to go out of their way and come to talk to them, 
positive energy is created by this gesture and opens the way 
towards reconciliation and harmony. Grievances mean felt 
problems. How they feel about it will say what their expected 
responses are, at least initially. The consultation report should 
show the measurable dimensions of the problem, as well as the 
emotional component, and whether their expected response 
is implementable.
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territory; (2) the six municipalities of Baloi, 
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan, and 
Tangkal in Lanao del Norte; barangays of the 
Municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, 
Pigkawayan, Pikit, and Midsayap that voted for 
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite; 
(3) the cities of Cotabato and Isabela; and (4) all 
other contiguous areas where there is a resolution 
of the local government unit or a petition of at 
least ten percent (10%) of the qualified voters in 
the area asking for their inclusion at least two 
months prior to the conduct of the ratification 
of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the process of 
delimitation of the Bangsamoro.
•	 Bangsamoro’s justice system shall cover the 
customary rights and traditions of indigenous 
peoples. 
•	 Vested property rights shall be recognized and 
respected. 
•	 Indigenous peoples’ rights shall be respected.
•	 Sett lement of legitimate grievances of the 
Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust 
dispossession of their territorial and proprietary 
r ights ,  customa r y la nd tenure ,  or t hei r 
marginalization. In case reparation is not possible, 
there shall be adequate reparation collectively. 
•	 A third-party monitoring team composed of 
international bodies and domestic groups shall 
monitor the implementation of all agreements.
•	 The MILF shall undertake a graduated program 
for decommissioning of its forces, complete with 
normalization process and timetables.
 Both panels are hoping that the GRP-MILF 
comprehensive compact shall be considered done 
before President Aquino steps out of Malacañang. 
The roadmap is already clear in the Framework 
Agreement. The various documents regarding 
this matter are made available to the public. What 
remains are the completion of the four annexes to 
the framework and immediately the formulation 
of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the installation 
of the new government structure. We need to 
reframe the foundations of this republic, but this 
time, it should be based on the free and informed 
consent of the governed. We need to create new 
boxes and see realities with new lenses—our own 
lenses, not those left behind by our colonizers. 
But the biggest question is the point of social 
consciousness. Are we ready for this constitutional 
change that will allow for distinct social spaces 
within the republic? 
2. On Rereading and Rewriting History
 I have an important question at this point. 
Which Philippines are we talking about when we 
talk about “Philippine history”? May I invite you 
to take one step backward to 12 June 1898? 
 On 12 June 1898, Emi l io Aguina ldo 
proclaimed the independence of the Philippines. 
As an affirmation of that event, we now celebrate 
our independence day on the twelfth of June. 
Question: Was the Philippines of 1898 the same 
as the Philippines we have today? 
 My reading is that in 1898, there were at least 
three states here in the region we now know as 
the territory of the Republic of the Philippines: 
the Philippines; the Sultanate of Sulu, which had 
been a state since 1450 to 1898; and the Sultanate 
of Maguindanao, which was founded in 1619 
and was still intact in 1898. All three suffered 
the same fate as victims of two colonial powers, 
Spain and the United States, embodied in the 
Treaty of Paris signed on 10 December 1898. 
Spain sold or ceded its so-called sovereignty 
over the Philippines, the Sultanate of Sulu, and 
the Sultanate of Maguindanao. That was how 
the Moros of the two sultanates and the Pat a 
Pongampong ko Ranao, or the four principalities 
of Lanao, became, on paper, one body politic and 
part of the present Philippines. Our defeats in 
the wars against the United States completed the 
process of domination. It was an act of unification 
without benefit of consent. We all became part 
of the Philippine Islands and colonial subject of 
the United States of America. In 1946, the United 
States gave back only one independence to the 
Republic of the Philippines. This was how the 
Moros became Filipinos. 
 So, identity-wise, who were the Filipinos 
in 1898? Only those who were covered by 
the Philippines declared as independent by 
Aguinaldo. The citizens of the two sultanates of 
Sulu and Maguindanao and the constituencies of 
the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranao had their own 
respective identities, definitely not Filipinos. 
 The territory of the Philippines refers only to 
those parts that were colonized and governed by 
the Spaniards and declared as independent by the 
Aguinaldo government. The two sultanates of Sulu 
and Maguindanao and the Pat a Pongampong ko 
Ranao were badly battered by war, suffered the 
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F I G U R E 1. Temporal changes in the extent of the Sultanates of Maguindanao (in gray) and Sulu (in black)
1900
 1945
1618–1671
1700
SULTANATE OF SULU
SULTANATE OF MAGUINDANAO
ignominy of defeat many times, and had garrisons 
maintained within their territories, but they were 
never effectively colonized or governed. They 
were certainly not colonized in the same way as 
the Filipinos were. I say that the two sultanates 
retained at least their de facto status as states—as 
de facto as the Philippines. This political reality 
is probably the reason why Aguinaldo sought 
authority from Congress to negotiate with the 
Sultanate of Sulu for a possible confederation. 
 So what is the role of the Treaty of Paris in our 
current discourse? In what way is this connected 
with the Philippine Constitution?     
 American occupation of the Philippines, as 
defined in the Treaty of Paris, is premised on the 
legitimacy of the treaty. What basic documents 
were used to govern the Philippine Islands? These 
are the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Jones Law of 
1916, the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, and the 
Commonwealth Constitution of 1934. Take note 
that each of these has affirmed the legitimacy of 
the Treaty of Paris. Since none of the subsequent 
constitutions have questioned this very point, I 
assume, too, that these latter constitutions have 
affirmed the treaty. The Republic of the Philippines 
of 1946 as we know it today was anchored on this 
erroneous—I repeat, erroneous—fundamental 
premise. It was the structure grounded on this 
erroneous premise that gave way to the extinction 
of the two respective Moro political structures.
3. On the So-called “Moro Problem”
 Who created the Moro problem? The bad 
blood between Christian Filipinos and Moros was 
created and nurtured by the Spanish colonizers 
during the many years of the Spanish-Moro war. 
When the Spanish colonizers tried to conquer 
the Moros, they always employed thousands of 
Christian Filipinos as soldiers and supporters. In 
their counterattacks, the Moros would also hit 
these Christian Filipino communities. Since it 
was the Spanish chroniclers who wrote the stories, 
they naturally labeled the Moros as “pirates” (one 
of the books was entitled Guerras Piráticas de 
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Filipinas contra Mindanaos y Joloanos written 
by Vicente Barrantes [Madrid, M.G. Hernandez, 
1878]). Unfortunately for us historians, the Moros 
never wrote their own impressions of the bloody 
events. What we have inherited is the deep-seated 
mutual distrust that Christian Filipinos have for 
Moros. This is one of the invisible problems that 
we face today. It interferes with the proper and 
objective appreciation of the political issues being 
raised by the Bangsamoro advocates.4  
 The American imperialists created a new 
political structure, one colony, one governance, 
one set of public land laws, which led to the 
resettlement of homesteaders from the rest 
of the Philippines into Mindanao and Sulu 
and the imposition of the English language in 
governance and in the public school system. The 
marginalization of the Moros and the Lumad or 
indigenous peoples of Mindanao was a direct 
consequence of these very structures. The 
structures were inherited from the American 
colonizers, which the Republic of the Philippines 
continued to use. It is precisely from these 
complex structures that the Bangsamoro is 
trying to extricate itself, thereby creating its 
own political space. The Lumad or indigenous 
peoples of Mindanao who are located within the 
new Bangsamoro structure, more specifically the 
Teduray, Lambangian, and Dulangan Manobo, 
are also working hard to create their own social 
space within the Bangsamoro.  
 The migrants and their descendants have 
been made to believe by government that the 
lands they acquired were public lands and their 
acquisitions were legitimate under the law and 
this government is the only legitimate government 
they know. They are bewildered not only by 
Bangsamoro claims to ancestral homeland, as it 
was articulated by the MNLF—the MILF later 
shifted the language to ancestral domain—but 
also by their audacity to assert their right to 
self-determination, not hesitating to employ the 
weapons of war. Threatened by these claims, they 
are naturally wary and afraid that the lands might 
be taken away from them and their lives disrupted 
by the wars that intermittently erupt in their 
midst. It is from this side where I hear comments 
like “Wipe them out to solve the Moro problem.”
4. On the Case of the Lumads
 Throughout this paper, the discussion on 
the plight of the Lumads, the originally non-
Christianized and non-Islamized indigenous 
peoples of Mindanao, have been discussed 
tangentially to the issue of he peace in the island. 
The Lumads have equal rights to their ancestral 
lands as the Bangsamoro, which is stated both in 
writing and in public declarations of the MNLF 
and MILF. Both Lumad and Muslim claim 
common ancestral roots (see Rodil 2003). This is 
partly the reason they are included in the front’s 
definition of Bangsamoro. 
 It must be noted, however, that these 
indigenous peoples have reached a level of 
political maturity such that in 1986, they had 
their own congress in North Cotabato where 
fifteen of the then known eighteen tribes of 
Mindanao decided to adopt Lumad (Bisaya for 
“indigenous” or “native”) as a collective name. 
Although it is ironic that the Lumad use a term 
from Bisaya to collectively call themselves, 
the language of the migrants from the Visayas 
that led to the dispossession of their lands, it is 
common knowledge that when the Lumads come 
together in big assemblies, they spontaneously 
shift to Bisaya as their lingua franca. Along 
with the name, they also proclaimed that they 
have their own right to self-determination and 
they wished to govern themselves within their 
respective ancestral domains in accordance 
with their customary laws. Eleven years later, 
4. The Moros hated the being called such. When I was in the 
grade school, if one wanted to have a fight with Moro kids, all 
one had to do was call them Moro. After the Moro National 
Liberation Front used the term in its name and fought for 
it, the term Moro has now acquired an honored position in 
Bangsamoro consciousness. It took a while for government to 
accept the name Bangsamoro. I remember using it in 1993 in 
one of the early meetings of the GRP Panel in the talks with 
the MNLF, and I was immediately corrected by my chair 
that the government panel, representing the Republic of the 
Philippines, cannot use this name because the government 
did not recognize it. But when I returned as a member of the 
GRP panel in 2004, the name Bangsamoro was gaining public 
acceptability and was being used in panel meetings without 
anyone raising any issue about it. So now we see both GRP 
and MILF panel using the name in an agreement and, to me 
as a Mindanao historian, this is historic and unprecedented, 
more so because the recognition of the name is followed by 
the recognition of the legitimate grievances and claims of the 
Bangsamoro people.
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the government enacted the Indigenous Peoples 
Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 recognizing the right of 
the Lumad to their lands and to self-governance. 
Now, they, too, like the Bangsamoro, cite the 
provision in the UN Declaration of Indigenous 
Peoples Rights recognizing their right to self-
determination.
 I should point out that from 1975 to 1996, 
both the government and the MNLF saw no 
need to consciously involve the Lumad in their 
negotiations. It was only in the last two years 
of the three-year negotiation that the MNLF 
included in their delegation one Lumad for a 
while, then a larger number in the last two rounds 
of negotiations. But they just sat there in silence. 
On the government side, there was no attempt to 
even consider Lumad presence in the negotiations. 
 To the credit of the GRP-MILF negotiations, 
Lumad presence was felt but only in the background 
as invited consultants, when deemed appropriate, 
in government technical working group meetings. 
In subsequent negotiations, starting from 2004, 
the government panel had one Lumad and the 
technical working group had three. The MILF 
has had one in the technical working group until 
the present. In the current government panel, 
there used to be a Lumad member but then his 
status was modified—his own decision—to senior 
consultant on indigenous peoples’ affairs since he 
was elected mayor and could not afford to neglect 
his responsibilities. 
 Lumad voice is also getting louder and more 
systematic in the espousal of their cause. Among 
the points raised is the assertion that while they 
recognize the legitimacy of the Bangsamoro 
struggle, they must insist that they, too, have their 
distinct identity, their own ancestral domain, 
and their own right to self-determination. They 
also recall, louder and more clearly, that their 
Moro and Lumad ancestors had entered into 
agreements, which included setting territorial 
borders. They urge upon their Bangsamoro 
counterpart to affirm these sacred agreements. 
For one thing, not only are these sacred, but these 
also have no expiration dates.      
 I like what I heard that the MILF panel had 
been holding dialogues with Lumad leaders in 
their public sorties. There are also more positive 
developments to date: there have been held already 
several re-affirmation ceremonies between Lumad 
and Moro leaders in Maguindanao, in Cotabato, 
in Bukidnon, and in Pagadian City. 
5. On Peace Education
 Even if a new comprehensive compact is 
arrived at in the coming months between the 
GRP and the MILF, it remains that there are many 
social problems inherited from history, one of 
which is straightening out our history. Whenever 
I share my rereading of Mindanao history, 
many participants in my various audiences have 
consistently asked, How come your version of 
history is not taught in our Philippine history 
books? It is incumbent upon government to ensure 
that correct Mindanao history is told in Philippine 
history books used in schools. To rewrite 
Mindanao-Sulu history will involve professional 
historians, but because we only have a few of them 
and these few do not stand in the same political 
or emotional arena, they are themselves part of 
the social divide among the citizens. Forming an 
assembly of historians is already a huge problem 
in itself because they, too, are part of the problem. 
 The teachers play a major role in creating 
a new generation of the republic. One sensitive 
solution is for the teachers to teach not only the 
corrected history but also nurture mutual respect 
and acceptance of each other’s culture. Allow me 
to make some suggestions: (1) review all existing 
Philippine history books from grade school to 
college; (2) list down major items that should 
be integrated; (3) note what parts of culture we 
use and practice; (4) keep in mind what kind of 
consciousness we nourish among our children; 
and (5) finally, agree on the Mindanao-Sulu vision 
that we want.
 I want to share with you my own doubts 
about the long-term impact of the use of English 
as a medium of teaching Philippine history. 
When the American colonial government 
imposed English in the Philippines, it was not 
only as a tool for learning but also a weapon of 
subjugation. The American government’s project 
was a big success, which is why we are still deep 
to our necks with it. My question is, Is it really 
proper to teach our own story to our own people 
using an alien tongue? Is this really the correct 
way to create a new generation of Filipinos using 
a foreign language? In my own experience, I 
have had three successes: (1) I have written the 
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Mindanao-Sulu history in simple English, (2) I 
have taught Philippine history in Filipino, and (3) 
I have also taught Lumad-Moro students in Bisaya. 
My students claimed that they had captured the 
local flavor of the story. In my experience in peace 
advocacy, I have noted that a patient narration 
of history, in their own languages, will tell them 
that we, all of us, have been heirs to a history that 
brought about the marginalization of the Lumad 
and the Bangsamoro in their ancestral lands, and 
the settlers were unwitting instruments in this 
marginalization process. Barangay communities, 
to whom I have had the opportunity to speak to, 
are able to appreciate their own history in their 
own language. Unfortunately, this is not normally 
taught in school. 
 We have another century to nurture our own 
languages, and in the process, we also decolonize 
ourselves. Hopefully, we can settle our armed 
conflicts using our own languages and do our 
peace processes within our own republic.
Concluding Reflections
This is where we are now, the part of convergence, 
not yet finished but ongoing. 
 The life in the republic was flowing beautifully 
when the BBL emerged. But then there was the 
eruption of the Mamasapano event—one huge 
boil, an eruptions of bad blood spilling all over the 
country. The widespread distrust between Moros 
and Christian migrants, which we inherited from 
Spanish colonialism, came to light. An echo 
from the past when Christians and Moros were 
made to fight each other like in a cockfight. This 
has increased my felt need to acknowledge the 
emotional dimension as an integral part of the 
problem. 
 Hence, this is the task of the present—
our—generation: to fix what once was broken 
in order to create a new history. We will do the 
moulding, based on our relationships, based 
on our acceptance of each other, based on our 
collective efforts. The passing into law of the 
Bangsamoro Basic Law is just the start. We need 
to talk to each other. Let us talk. This is our life. 
Our world. In our own hands. 
 So while the two panels of the GRP and the 
Moro are trying to sort out the details of their 
agreements, the public must also be prepared 
to dialogue with each other. So much the better 
if the details of the agreements can be publicly 
discussed. All parties ought to appreciate how they 
will be affected by the comprehensive compact. It 
is important for all—Lumad, Bangsamoro, and 
settlers—to realize that coming to terms with 
history is also coming to terms with one another’s 
presence in a land that is now shared.  
 According to a Timuay Arumanen (Manobo) 
in Carmen, North Cotabato, we must view 
Mindanao as a clay pot balancing on three stones 
each representing the Bangsamoro, the Lumad, 
and the migrants. All of us draw our food from 
the same pot. The issue of peace in Mindanao 
should not be a numbers game, but rather, an 
endeavor that is anchored on the recognition of 
equality of all its inhabitants. We need to dialogue 
to determine acceptable social spaces for everyone 
in a spirit of mutual recognition and mutual 
acceptance of each other’s collective rights. We 
must learn to dream together and to find peace 
in each other’s presence.
 In the end, the one true goal of any settlement 
of conflict is husay, sandugo, and kapatiran. Or: 
harmony, mutual acceptance, and fellowship.
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